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THE CONCEPT OF CRIMINAL LAW
Sandra G. Mayson†

Abstract
What distinguishes “criminal law” from all other law? This question should be central to
both criminal law theory and criminal justice reform. Clarity about the distinctive feature(s) of
criminal law is especially important in the current moment, as the nation awakens to the damage
that the carceral state has wrought and reformers debate the value and the future of criminal law
institutions. Foundational though it is, however, the question has received limited attention. There
is no clear consensus among contemporary scholars or reformers about what makes the criminal
law unique.
This Essay argues that Antony Duff’s The Realm of Criminal Law offers an answer—and
that the answer is correct. Duff rightly diagnoses criminal law as unique by virtue of the fact that
it censures particular acts in the polity’s name. It is a mechanism of collective condemnation. The
Essay advocates recognition of this concept of criminal law and draws out implications for both
criminal law theory and criminal law reform.

† Assistant Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. I would like to express the deepest gratitude to Antony
Duff, Doug Husak and Alec Walen for inviting me to participate in this symposium, and for their endless generosity to new scholars.
Many thanks as well to the other participants for very helpful comments, to the Rutgers Philosophy Department for hosting us, to
Maron Deering and Jocelyn Simonson for their patience and insight, and to Casey Sack and George Thomas for excellent editorial
assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
Prison abolition. Reparations. Human caging. These words have leapt from radical corners
into mainstream discourse1 and legal scholarship,2 and it is about time. A century and a half after
the South enacted vagrancy laws to re-enslave black men,3 America is finally grappling with the
racial legacy of our criminal justice system. This belated awakening is driving a schism in criminal
justice reform circles. Efforts to reduce the reach of the criminal legal system have found broad
support along the length of the political spectrum. Increasingly, though, reformers who identify as
abolitionists reject incremental measures that seek to remedy the worst excesses of the system
without disrupting its basic operations.4 They understand the problem as one not of excess but of
fundamental structure.5 The scale of the system is only a symptom. True reform requires dramatic,
totalizing change: Abolish prisons.6 Abolish the police.7 Abolish criminal law itself.8 Reject
textbook theories of justice and attend to the lived experience of those directly affected.9
Antony Duff’s The Realm of Criminal Law10 does not explicitly engage these debates.
Although Duff’s magisterial exposition addresses a social problem—overcriminalization—he
diagnoses it as a problem of scale and, at a deeper level, of conceptual incoherence. The discussion
does not highlight the distributional race and class concerns that animate so much contemporary
debate. Even on its own terms, Duff’s argument for a thin, formal “master principle” of
criminalization seems like a vehicle for piecemeal reform at best.
Yet The Realm does bear on existential reform debates, because it addresses an overlooked
first step in any coherent deliberation about the future of the criminal legal system: defining
“criminal law.” What is the nature of the thing we seek to reform? What—if anything—makes
criminal law a distinctive kind of law? Duff undertakes this task because one cannot deliberate
about what to criminalize without determining what the criminal law is for; and one cannot
deliberate about what the criminal law is for without determining what it is. This initial,
definitional task, though, is necessary to more than criminalization theory. It is necessary to
debates about the value and future of criminal law itself. And notwithstanding the centrality of the
question, there appears to be no clear consensus among either scholars or reformers about what
differentiates criminal law from every other kind of law.

1 E.g. Ta Nehisi-Coates, The Case for Reparations, THE ATLANTIC (June 2014); P.R. Lockhart, The 2020 Democratic Primary
Debate over Reparations, Explained, VOX.COM (June 19, 2019); Rachel Kushner, Is Prison Necessary? Ruth Wilson Gilmore Might
Change Your Mind, THE N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE (Apr. 17, 2019); Michael Zuckerman, Alec Karakatsanis ’08 Puts ‘Human Caging’
and ‘Wealth-Based Detention’ in America on Trial, HARVARD LAW TODAY (Aug. 23, 2017).
2 E.g. Harvard Law Review, Vol. 132 Issue 6 (2019) (dedicated to prison abolition).
3 See generally DOUGLAS BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE
CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II (2008).
4 Penal abolitionism is a broad movement that encompasses diverse groups and strains of thought. See generally Michael J.
Coyle and Judah Schept, Penal Abolition Praxis, 26 CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY 319 (2018). Due to space constraints, I use the terms
“abolitionist” and “abolitionism” quite reductively throughout this Essay.
5 See, e.g., Paul Butler, The System Is Working the Way It Is Supposed to: The Limits of Criminal Justice Reform, 104 GEO. L.
J. 1419 (2016); Benjamin Levin, The Consensus Myth in Criminal Justice Reform, 117 MICH. L. REV. 259, 262 (2018); Alec
Karakatsanis, The Punishment Bureaucracy: How to Think About "Criminal Justice Reform", 128 YALE L.J. FORUM 848, 852
(2019).
6 See, e.g., ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? (2003).
7 See, e.g., Meghan G. McDowell and Luis A. Fernandez, ‘Disband, Disempower, and Disarm’: Amplifying the Theory and
Practice of Police Abolition, 26 CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY 373 (2018).
8 See, e.g., Abolitionist Principles and Campaign Strategies for Prosecutor Organizing, COMMUNITY JUSTICE EXCHANGE,
https://www.communityjusticeexchange.org/abolitionist-principles.
9 See, e.g., Allegra M. McLeod, Envisioning Abolition Democracy: Developments in the Law, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1613 (2019).
10 R. A. DUFF, THE REALM OF CRIMINAL LAW (2018) [hereinafter “DUFF”].
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This Essay contends that Duff gets the answer right.11 The fact that makes criminal law a
unique form of law is that it operates as a mechanism of collective condemnation. It is a body of
law and legal practice that censures particular acts in the polity’s name. This concept of criminal
law makes sense of the bulk of existing criminal-law doctrine and institutions. To my mind, it is
the only concept of criminal law that can. It is not a novel concept of criminal law, and it is
consistent with nearly all theories of criminal law and punishment in current circulation. But nor
is it universally recognized.
Achieving clarity about the nature of criminal law is important for theory and reform
12
alike. For purposes of theory, recognizing criminal law as a mechanism of collective
condemnation helps to refine the questions up for debate, because the concept logically entails
certain constraints on criminalization and punishment. For purposes of reform, recognizing
criminal law as a mechanism of collective condemnation is essential to thinking about whether we
want a criminal legal system at all, and what, in its best form, it should look like.
The Realm ultimately offers a compelling case for the criminal law. Only a mechanism of
collective condemnation can enact a polity’s shared moral code. Only a mechanism of collective
condemnation can constitute a polity as a community of moral agents. Criminal law is not just
useful to a liberal republic; it is vital. The challenge for reform is to forge a future in which our
legal institution of collective censure promotes both accountability and forgiveness, condemns acts
without condemning people, and works to mitigate inequality rather than to drive it.
I. CRIMINAL LAW AS A MECHANISM OF COLLECTIVE CONDEMNATION
A. What Makes Criminal Law Unique?
The Realm of Criminal Law begins with this question. As Duff explains, “[a] normative
theory of criminalization . . . must depend on an account of what the criminal law is for.”13 And
“[a]n account of what the criminal law is for must depend on what the criminal law is: what are its
distinguishing features as a particular kind of law?”14
There are several things this question is not about.
This is not a question about the inherent meaning of the words “criminal law,” as Duff
15
notes. They have no inherent meaning. A linguistic community might ascribe them a new
meaning or eliminate the term altogether.16 It is, rather, a question about the set of institutions and
practices to which those words attach.
The question is also not about what makes criminal law a kind of law. Criminal law must
have certain features by virtue of being law. What they are depends on what “law” is. Any concept
of criminal law thus embeds a concept of law. The concept of law—or the nature of law, for realists

11

Duff might deny that he answers the question at all. See infra Part I.B.
Perhaps this Essay should be titled “The Nature of Criminal Law” and dispense with the intermediary notion of a concept.
See Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277 (1985) (describing and defending a realist
theory of meaning); Michael S. Moore, The Various Relations between Law and Morality in Contemporary Legal Philosophy, 25
RATIO JURIS 435, 438-40 (2012). (differentiating between effort to draw “analytically” versus “metaphysically” necessary
connections between law and morality). Given space constraints and my own ambivalence, I leave the question open.
13 DUFF, supra note 10, at 11.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 50-51.
16 Cf. Vincent Chiao, What is the Criminal Law For?, 35 L. & PHIL. 137, 159 (2016) (expressing skepticism about the
importance of “received legal categories”).
12
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about meaning17—is the subject of enduring and intricate debate, but for present purposes it
suffices to note that contemporary positivists and non-positivists alike acknowledge certain
features as central to a system of law: the existence of action-guiding norms that are publicly
available, intelligible, generally applicable, prospective rather than retrospective, and enforced by
a neutral authority through procedures that guard against error.18 To qualify as criminal law, a
given set of norms and institutions must first of all qualify as law.
Finally, the question of what makes criminal law unique is notably not about what is most
central to criminal law, nor about which of its features do the most good or the most harm. Those
questions are important. But they are not at issue here.
The question at issue here is what distinguishes criminal law from every other kind of law.
This question is logically prior to questions about what justifies criminal law, what criminal law
is for, and how to reform criminal law. To answer such questions—to even consider them—it is
necessary to identify the object they address. When we talk about “criminal law,” what are we
talking about?
As Michael Moore has explained, this question embeds two layers. We need to know not
only what kind of thing criminal law is, but also what “kind of kind.”19 Criminal law might be a
nominal kind: a set of doctrines and institutions that have evolved in the particular shape they have
purely by happenstance, to which we attach the label “criminal law” by mere convention. If
criminal law is a nominal kind, the only kind of definition possible is a description of its current
state. The concept of criminal law is coextensive with the reality of criminal law, and there are no
normative criteria intrinsic to criminal law by which to judge its current operation. We can only
judge the success of criminal law by reference to extrinsic normative criteria. The other possibility
is that criminal law has a deeper identity: We designate a set of doctrines and institutions as this
particular kind of law by virtue of certain structural or functional features. If that is so, a definition
of “criminal law” requires identification of the relevant features.20 The concept of criminal law is
a statement of those features that are necessary and sufficient to constitute an instance of criminal
law.21 If criminal law has this kind of deeper identity, we can evaluate how successful a given
criminal law system is as criminal law, as well as with reference to extrinsic normative criteria.
B. Duff’s (Ambivalent) Answer
Duff himself does not purport to offer a concept of criminal law at all. He is both modest
and cautious; he claims only to present his own particular conception of criminal law, one
candidate among others.22 Yet the text is ambivalent. In his first chapter, for instance, Duff outlines

17

See supra note 12.
See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of Law, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY,
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rule-of-law (last visited Sept. 24, 2019).
19 MICHAEL S. MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 19-23 (1997).
20 See DUFF, supra note 10, at 12. Moore further differentiates between “natural” and “functional” kinds. MOORE, supra note
12, at 19-23.
21 See DUFF, supra note 10, at 12 (noting that the identification of such features will inevitably be “selective, and normatively
informed”).
22 See, e.g., DUFF, supra note 10, at 6 (“Chapter 1 develops a conception of criminal law as a distinctive kind of legal institution
. . . . This account is not meant to provide an analysis of ‘the concept of criminal law’—of, for instance, the necessary and sufficient
conditions for anything to count as a system of criminal law . . . .”).
18
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those features he “takes to be central” to criminal law but disavows any intent to be engaged in
conceptual analysis.23 Elsewhere he admits to conceptual analysis.24
Regardless, The Realm does offer a concept of criminal law.25 Duff clearly believes that
criminal law is more than a nominal kind. Criminal law has a distinct identity, he argues, and the
fact that makes criminal law a distinctive kind of law is that it operates as a mechanism of collective
condemnation. He writes, for instance, that the distinctive feature of criminal law is “the censure
or condemnation that a conviction involves:”26 a conviction “formally condemns [the accused’s]
conduct as a wrong, and formally censures her, as the agent of that conduct, as a wrongdoer.”27
Likewise, “to criminalize a type of conduct is to portray, and condemn, it as wrongful.”28 The
distinctive feature of punishment—the thing that differentiates it from quarantine or tax
penalties—is that “punishment is intended to communicate or to express censure.”29 It follows that
“censurable wrongfulness is integral to criminal law in a way that it is not integral to a system of
non-criminal regulation.”30
Duff never says that what is necessary and sufficient to constitute an iteration of criminal
law, as distinct from every other kind of law, is a set of doctrines and practices that together operate
as a mechanism of collective condemnation. He writes instead that “part of what is distinctive
about criminal law is that it portrays the conduct that it criminalizes as wrongful.”31 Later he
asserts, with arguable inconsistency, that “the distinctive function of criminal law . . . is that it
helps to sustain the polity’s civil order.”32 It is almost in spite of himself that Duff offers up a
concept of criminal law.
Yet the collective-condemnation concept of criminal law runs throughout The Realm. It
anchors Duff’s commitment to distinguishing public from private wrongs. It animates his
discussion of what constitutes a polity. It both motivates and follows from his exploration of the
ways that criminal legal systems do, can, and should call members of the polity to account for their
public wrongs.
This collective-condemnation concept of criminal law is not a novel one.33 Some sources,
in fact, suggest that it is already a matter of consensus. Joshua Dressler’s Understanding Criminal
Law—best-selling hornbook, boon to first-year law students and their teachers alike—begins with
the assertion that the thing that “essentially distinguishes the criminal law from its civil counterpart
. . . is the societal condemnation and stigma that accompanies the conviction”: A conviction is “an
expression of the community’s moral outrage, directed at the criminal actor, for her act.”34 As
23

E.g. id. at 6, 13.
Id. at 11 (“The analytical exercise [of determining what criminal law is] is an exercise in conceptual analysis.”); 12-13 (“It
will be a conceptual analysis insofar as I will be claiming that anything that we are to count as a system of criminal law must display
at least some of the features that I will highlight . . . .”).
25 Or at least a concept of criminal law in contemporary Western democracies. Duff avoids any suggestion that he—or
anyone—could “tell us what counts as criminal law at all times and all places.” Id. at 11.
26 Id. at 18 (asserting that “a criminal conviction is essentially censorious”).
27 Id. at 34.
28 Id. at 260.
29 Id. at 19; see also id. at 37 (“[W]hat distinguishes punishments from taxes or ‘penalties’ is their typically reprobative
nature.”).
30 Id. at 19.
31 Id. at 20 (emphasis added).
32 Id. at 232. This is a strange claim. Many other fields of law—not least constitutional law—help to sustain the polity’s civil
order. Duff presumably means that the criminal law helps to sustain the polity’s civil order in a unique way.
33 It echoes Durkheim’s views, among others. See Emile Durkheim, Crime and Punishment, in DURKHEIM AND THE LAW 69
(Steven Lukes and Andrew Scull eds. 1983) (opining that punishment functions “to maintain inviolate the cohesion of society by
sustaining the common consciousness . . . to give voice to the unanimous aversion that the crime does not fail to evoke . . . .”).
34 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 2 (7th ed. 2015).
24
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authority, Dressler cites Henry Hart’s 1958 article, The Aims of the Criminal Law, which puts the
matter succinctly: “What distinguishes a criminal from a civil sanction and all that distinguishes
it, it is ventured, is the judgment of community condemnation which accompanies and justifies its
imposition.”35
Most contemporary criminal law theorists appear to endorse the collective-condemnation
concept of criminal law, whether explicitly or implicitly.36 Surveying scholarship on the criminalcivil divide in 1997, Carol Steiker summarized the field as concluding that the distinguishing
feature of punishment is that it necessarily “expresses blame.”37 And Duff himself notes that
“theorists often include some notion of censure in their analytical accounts of criminal
punishment,” because “a key difference between punishment and other kinds of burdensome
imposition . . . is that punishment is intended to communicate or express censure.”38
Nonetheless, it is not clear that a consensus on the distinctive feature(s) of criminal law
exists! Duff does not seem to think so.39 Many theorists, including Duff himself, are equivocal
about whether its collective-condemnatory nature is the distinguishing feature of criminal law or
just one of them.40 Some theorists seem to reject the notion that criminal law has any meaningful
distinguishing feature at all; they see it as a purely nominal kind.41 Perhaps most unsettling for a
new criminal-law teacher, her textbook never explicitly identifies or addresses the question of what

35

Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 404 (1958).
E.g. LARRY ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 18 (2009)
(“The criminal law prevents harm by inculcating and reinforcing norms about how to treat others and operates in accordance with
norms about deserved and appropriate punishment for the violation of those norms.”); ANDREW ASHWORTH & LUCIA ZEDNER,
PREVENTIVE JUSTICE 14 (2014) (identifying “censure” as one of “key elements” of punishment, and implicitly as the only unique
element); H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 11, 13, 17 (2d ed. 2008) (identifying
a culpability requirement—“the restrictive principle of Distribution”—as the thing that distinguishes punishment from preventive
restraint, and thus criminal from non-criminal law); DOUGLAS HUSAK, IGNORANCE OF LAW: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 26 (2016)
(defining punishment as a state response that “deliberately expresses condemnation or stigma and imposes a deprivation or hardship
on the offender”); Joshua Kleinfeld, Reconstructivism: The Place of Criminal Law in Ethical Life, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1565
(2016) (arguing that criminal law is distinctive as “an instrument of normative reconstruction” that operates through “condemnatory
punishment”); MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note19, at 33 (arguing that criminal law is a
functional kind, the distinctive function of which is to “attain retributive justice”); VICTOR TADROS, THE ENDS OF HARM: THE
MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 3 (2011) (“The right to punish offenders . . . is grounded in the duties that they incur as a
result of their wrongdoing.”); GIDEON YAFFE, ATTEMPTS: IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 32 (2010) (“To
punish for conduct is to express the judgment that the conduct is an appropriate object of disapproval and condemnation: this is
censure.”); Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, 49 THE MONIST 397, 400 (1965) (identifying the expression of
blame as the distinguishing feature of punishment); Andrew von Hirsch, Censure and Proportionality, in A READER ON
PUNISHMENT 118 (R.A. Duff & David Garland eds., 1994) (asserting that difference between a tax and a punitive fine is that “the
fine conveys disapproval or censure, whereas the tax does not”).
37 Carol S. Steiker, Foreword: Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the Criminal-Civil Procedural Divide, 85
GEO. L.J. 775, 799 (1997); 800–05 (describing evolution of scholarship on question of what defines “punishment”).
38 DUFF, supra note 10, at 19.
39 Id. at 21 (“I would be very happy if the claim that the criminal law is essentially concerned with wrongdoing was
uncontroversial.”).
40 E.g. DUFF AT 6-13, 28; James Edwards, Theories of Criminal Law, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/criminal-law
(describing features of criminal law that make it “distinctive” without discussing which are necessary or sufficient to constitute
criminal law); Antony Duff, Theories of Criminal Law, 2013, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/criminal-law (“It
would be unproductive to ask whether all these are strictly necessary features of criminal law . . . .”).
41 See, e.g., Chiao, supra note16, at 159 (“[T]he public law conception adopts an unapologetically revisionist attitude toward
received legal categories generally, and the civil-criminal (or criminal-regulatory) distinction in particular.”); see also id. at 15859 (conceding that “the public law conception represents criminal justice institutions as functionally continuous with many other
forms of coercive state power”); Vincent Chiao, Two Conceptions of Criminal Law, in THE NEW PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW
25 (Chad Flanders & Zachary Hoskins, eds., 2016) (“[F]rom a public law perspective, what is unique about the criminal law is
simply the severity of its sanctions.”). But see Chiao, supra note16, at 137 (“It is in the nature of the kind of thing it is that
punishment—and hence the criminal law—serves to expressively vindicate rights and condemn wrongs.”).
36
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distinguishes criminal from non-criminal law.42 A recent edited volume, Philosophical
Foundations of Criminal Law, raises the question of whether we should “hope to specify the
necessary or defining features that any practice must display if it is to count as a system of criminal
law,”43 but does not answer it.
So the situation is an odd one. Some authorities treat the matter as settled: The defining
feature of criminal law is the condemnation it expresses on behalf of the community. Others
suggest, enigmatically, that the matter is far from settled. A vast quantity of contemporary theory
ignores or elides the question.
This Essay advocates the following proposition: As Henry Hart wrote, as Duff (sometimes)
asserts, the distinguishing feature of the criminal law—in conceptual terms—is that it operates as
a mechanism of collective condemnation. A criminal conviction asserts blame in the community’s
name. Other bodies of law deter harm and wrongdoing, incapacitate the dangerous, rehabilitate the
compromised, and inflict hard treatment. Some other legal mechanisms speak in the name of the
people. It is arguable that certain other bodies of law operate as condemnatory mechanisms
(punitive damages in tort, for instance).44 But no other body of law is designed and perceived as a
mechanism of condemnation that operates on the polity’s behalf. It cannot be said of any other
body of law that if it ceased to express condemnation of particular acts in the name of the polity,
it would lose any unique identity.
C. Qualifications
Three qualifications are in order. First, as noted above, to say that criminal law is a
mechanism of collective condemnation does not exhaust its necessary features. It must also have
the necessary attributes of law.45 Nor is it to say that the condemnatory aspect of criminal law is
the only feature of the system that requires justification, or even the most important one. To the
extent that a criminal-law system inflicts coercive deprivations of liberty, its coercive aspects
likely stand in greatest need of justification.46 The claim is simply that the distinguishing feature
of criminal law is that it expresses collective condemnation.
A second set of qualifications relate to the terms of the concept itself. I have been ignoring
a great deal of complexity in the interest of stripping the concept to its essence. But this core
concept raises a further set of questions. What does it mean for a set of doctrines, institutions and
practices to “operate as a mechanism of collective condemnation”? Need it so operate in every
case? Surely not. Who need understand the condemnatory message, and what does such
understanding entail? What does it mean for the criminal law to speak for the “collective”? What
do we mean by “condemnation”? And so forth.
A third qualification is that although it may be clear that the collective-condemnation
feature is necessary to constitute a system of criminal law (as distinct from a regulatory system of
sanctions and detention, for instance), it is far less clear that this feature is sufficient. Might other
42 CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS (Sanford H. Kadish, Stephen J. Schulhofer, & Rachel E. Barkow,
eds., 10th ed. 2017).
43 PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 5 (R.A. Duff & Stuart P. Green, eds., 2011).
44 Cf. Dan Markel, Retributive Damages: A Theory of Punitive Damages As Intermediate Sanction, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 239
(2009) (advocating retributive framework to guide and rationalize punitive damages).
45 See supra Part I.A.
46 Accord Chiao, supra note 41, at 25 (“[W]hat makes the use of such [criminal] sanctions so difficult to justify is not its [sic]
condemnatory message per se but rather the degree of coercion with which those messages are conveyed.”). Cf. Mitchell N. Berman,
Punishment and Justification, 118 ETHICS 258 (2008) (exploring what it means to say that punishment stands in need of
justification).
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features also be necessary? For instance: Is punishment beyond a conviction necessary, or could
we imagine a system that only announced convictions that we would still recognize as criminal
law? Must criminal law be dedicated to attaining retributive justice, and, if so, what does retributive
justice require? Truth and reconciliation commissions censure wrongdoing on behalf of the polity.
Are they criminal law institutions?47 It may be that a concept of criminal law should entail more
detail than “a set of laws and legal institutions that operate as a mechanism of collective
condemnation,” or it may be that no concept of criminal law can cleanly categorize everything.
There may be paradigmatic instances of criminal law, clear instances of non-criminal law, and a
gray borderland in between.
Still, it seems useful to offer this concept of criminal law at least in provisional terms.
Acknowledging that the uniqueness of criminal law lies in its mode of collective condemnation
offers a foundation for debates about its purpose, its justification, and its future.
D. A Concept versus a Conception
A last objection to the concept of criminal law proposed here is that there is no need to
assert a concept of criminal law at all. The modest theorist should content herself, as Duff does,
with offering one possible “conception.” The difference, put crudely, is that to assert a concept of
criminal law is to assert an objective truth, whereas to assert a conception is to present one possible
understanding of the phenomenon we call “criminal law” without claiming objective supremacy
over others.48
Notwithstanding the value of modesty, there is also value in striving to identify the concept
of criminal law. The first reason is that there is an objective truth of the matter.49 There really are
certain features that make the set of laws and institutions that we call “criminal law” different from
all other bodies of law. Those features, which include the social meaning of conviction and
punishment and the stringent procedures we consequently require to protect against error, are not
the accidental traits of institutions that evolved by chance. They have an internal normative logic,
which, as Duff so elegantly explains, both derives from and helps to constitute the value structure
of a liberal republic.
Secondly, and more importantly for present purposes, a concept of criminal law is
necessary to criminal law theory and policy alike. We can argue all day about the justification of
punishment or criteria for criminalization, but if we are all operating with different conceptions of
the criminal law, we are arguing past each other. Our conflicting views about criminalization may
be equally sound given our divergent conceptions of what it is to criminalize. The abolitionist
challenge to criminal law institutions highlights the need for foundational clarity. A shared concept
of criminal law is essential to fruitful debate over whether we need criminal law and, if so, how to
make it the best it can be.50
II. THE CONCEPT OF CRIMINAL LAW AS A FOUNDATION FOR THEORY

47

Thanks to Victor Tadros for suggesting the example.
See generally, e.g., Maite Ezcurdia, The Concept-Conception Distinction, 9 PHIL. ISSUES 187 (1998). Cf. Chiao, supra note
41 (describing “two conceptions of criminal law”).
49 In my subjective opinion.
50 Again, there is a question as to whether we need a “concept” of criminal law or should just proceed on a direct-reference
theory of meaning, as Michael Moore does. See supra note 12.
48
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Recognizing criminal law as a mechanism of collective condemnation promotes clarity in
theoretical debate, because the concept logically entails certain constraints on criminalization and
punishment. They include four central features of Duff’s criminalization framework. First, given
that the criminal law condemns, things designated as crimes must warrant condemnation.51
Criminal laws must thus adhere to some kind of wrongfulness constraint, or “negative legal
moralism”: “[I]f we are to maintain such a system, it should criminalize only censurably wrongful
conduct.”52 Second, things designated crimes must warrant condemnation by the collective. This
requires some notion of a “public wrong.” The relevant collective is the community in whose name
the law speaks, and to whom it speaks—“the polity whose law it is”.53 Third, the censure actually
inflicted in an individual case must be warranted; this entails a retributivist limit on punishment.54
And fourth, criminal law, by its nature, is a communicative and declaratory enterprise that helps
to constitute a polity’s civil order, as well as relationships between members of the polity and
between individuals and the collective.55
To recognize these four corollaries does not foreclose debate about their content. It does
not begin to resolve what a coherent negative legal moralism or negative retributivism entails,
what we should understand to constitute a “public wrong,” or the precise contours of the criminal
law’s communicative and constitutive functions. But it does establish a clear conceptual
infrastructure to frame those debates.
The collective-condemnation concept of criminal law leaves other deep questions open.
It leaves open, for instance, the question of whether punishment is necessary to the
condemnatory mechanism. As Duff suggests, the answer might depend on how we define
“punishment.”56 If a public judgment of guilt is itself punishment, then punishment is indeed
necessary to criminal law. If not, it is unclear whether punishment is necessary. Duff presents a
compelling case that it is the collective judgment of responsibility rather than the sanction imposed
that represents the core mechanism of the criminal law.57
The collective-condemnation concept of criminal law also leaves open the question of what
the criminal law is for. It establishes that criminal law is a distinctive kind of mechanism. But such
a mechanism might be put to many uses.
By way of analogy, consider a hammer. A hammer is “a hand tool consisting of a solid
head set crosswise on a handle and used for pounding.”58 Its distinctive mode of operation is to
pound. The purpose of a hammer, though, can be stated more broadly. Hammers are used to drive
nails into wood, build houses, break things apart, and shape metal. A single hammer can have
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52 DUFF, supra note 10, at 21.
53 DUFF, supra note 10, at 117.
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See YAFFE, supra note 36, at 32.
55 As well as The Realm, see generally R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY (2001).
56 See DUFF, supra note 10, at 223-25.
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many purposes. The purpose of any particular hammer depends on its context and the intentions
of the person who wields it.
The criminal law’s mechanism of collective condemnation might likewise be directed
toward any number of goals. The central purpose of criminal law could be to help to constitute and
sustain a polity’s civil order, as Duff sometimes suggests.59 Or it could be, as Michael Moore
contends, to “attain retributive justice.”60 It could be harm prevention—or “securing civil
order”61—via deterrence,62 the inculcation of pro-social norms or attitudes,63 incapacitation,
treatment or training of the crime-prone, or some combination. As Duff notes, furthermore, there
seems little reason to assume that the criminal law must be limited to a single purpose.64 It could
have multiple purposes.65 Different areas of criminal law might even have different objectives.66
The aims of the criminal law might remain in perpetual flux. They might depend on the nature and
the aims of the polity whose law it is.67
This is not to say that the collective-condemnation concept of criminal law imposes no
constraint on its purposes. The criminal law’s distinctive mode of operation—censuring in the
name of the polity—must be at least a part of its purpose.68 Arguably, this is the criminal law’s
“intrinsic” purpose (or function) whereas the further goals we might use the censuring mechanism
to pursue are “instrumental” purposes (or functions).69 Relatedly, the fact that censure and
punishment must be limited by desert means that the criminal law is not always an effective means
of pursuing goals like harm prevention.70 The tension between its distinctive mode of moral
censure and utilitarian goals like harm prevention leads some theorists to conclude that the criminal
law cannot coherently pursue both retributive and utilitarian objectives.71 Others think that, tension
notwithstanding, multiple purposes are possible.72 The relevant point here is that the collectivecondemnation concept of criminal law does not resolve the debate.
Nor does the collective-condemnation concept of criminal law resolve when punishment
is justified, beyond the constraint of negative desert. It does not determine whether (or when) desert
is a sufficient condition for punishment as well as a necessary one. It does not determine the content
of desert or of deserved punishment. It neither affirms nor precludes a “duty view of
punishment.”73 And it does not resolve the relevance of utilitarian concerns to the determination
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61 Farmer, supra note 57, at 111.
62 See, e.g., Hart, supra note 35.
63 See, e.g., Alexander & Ferzan, supra note 36, at 18; Chiao, supra note 16, at 138 (“The criminal law supports the possibility
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66 See Farmer, supra note 57, at 112.
67 DUFF, supra note 10, at 152 (recognizing this).
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69 This is Michael Moore’s suggested vocabulary from the symposium.
70 See, e.g., Darin Clearwater, ‘If the Cloak Doesn’t Fit, You Must Acquit’: Retributivist Models of Preventive Detention and
the Problem of Coextensiveness, 11 Crim. L. & Phil. 49 (2017); Sandra G. Mayson, Collateral Consequences and the Preventive
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as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1444 (2001).
71 See, e.g., Moore, PLACING BLAME, supra note 19, at 83-187.
72 See, e.g., DUFF, supra note 10, at 265; Douglas Husak, Lifting the Cloak: Preventive Detention as Punishment, 48 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 1173 (2011).
73 See generally VICTOR TADROS, THE ENDS OF HARM: THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW (2011).
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of what punishment is just. Lastly, to say that criminal law is a mechanism of collective
condemnation does not resolve precisely what procedures it must, or should, entail.
I see no reason to believe that there should be unitary answers to the questions of what
criminal law (or punishment) is for, what justifies punishment (or criminal laws), or what
procedures are sufficient or optimal to operate a system of criminal law. It seems both possible
and necessary for criminal-law theorists to recognize that what makes criminal law unique is the
fact that it operates as a mechanism of collective condemnation, and thus to adopt a shared concept
of criminal law. By contrast, perhaps it is neither necessary nor possible to reach consensus on the
questions that this concept of criminal law leaves open.74
III. THE CONCEPT OF CRIMINAL LAW AS A FOUNDATION FOR REFORM
Recognizing criminal law as a mechanism of collective condemnation also helps to refine
the question of whether we want a criminal law at all. The question becomes: Do we want a
mechanism of collective condemnation? If so, what role should it play in a diverse and fractured
republic like the contemporary United States?
There are reasons to doubt the value of collective condemnation. For purposes of analytical
clarity, let us set out the stance of a hypothetical abolitionist who would reject criminal law
altogether. The abolitionist notes that, from a utilitarian perspective, there is no reason to believe
that a collective-condemnation mechanism is an especially effective means of preventing harm,
relative to alternatives. Given its costs, she argues, we should simply excise it from the state’s
arsenal of crime-control measures. We can focus instead on more cost-effective strategies to
remedy the conditions that give rise to harmful behavior in the first place, and on practices of
therapeutic and restorative justice that ameliorate harm when it happens.75 If the state must resort
to some kind of coercion to prevent harmful acts, it should at least forego moral judgment.76
The abolitionist might cite several grounds for preferring non-judgmental coercion. One is
the metaphysical view that rejects moral responsibility entirely.77 A second is the more pragmatic
notion that, whatever its value in theory, a mechanism of collective condemnation will inflict too
much injustice in practice. One variant of this argument might be that in the contemporary United
States, we lack the kind of collective that can sustain a functional criminal law; any effort to operate
a criminal legal system will merely impose the will of the powerful on the powerless.78 Another
variant might be that, in a society marked by structural inequality, criminal law enforcement will
74
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tend to disproportionately burden already-marginalized groups.79 That burden has a pernicious
character. High rates of prosecution and conviction not only inflict tangible harm, disrupting lives
and splintering families. Because convictions express condemnation, a disparate conviction rate
among a marginalized group also conveys condemnation of the group as a whole. Mass conviction
means mass condemnation.80 Worst of all, because each conviction is theoretically deserved, the
aggregate condemnation can appear deserved as well. Of course it is not. The notion that
historically marginalized communities deserve the fruits of their exclusion is, to put it mildly,
perverse. The hypothetical abolitionist might argue that the injustice of this disparate
condemnation outweighs any benefit the criminal law could provide.
Yet there are also reasons to cherish and protect the criminal law. The Realm lays some of
them out, for Duff sees a mechanism of collective condemnation as vital to a liberal republic. Duff
does not stake his claim on utilitarian grounds. Perhaps alternative approaches to crime control are
more effective at that task! Duff’s view, rather, is that criminal law is indispensable because it is
uniquely capable of constituting a polity as a community of moral agents.81
The first prong in the Duffian case is that the criminal law plays a unique role in
constituting the civil order by virtue of the particular acts that it condemns. The process of
criminalization is recursive. The polity’s civil order shapes its decisions about what to criminalize;
its criminal code, in turn, helps to shape its civil order.82 This kind of recursivity is inherent to all
democratic law-making. But the moral valence of a criminal code makes it a more immediate
reflection of—and input to—the moral life of the polity than, say, the polity’s highway regulations.
Only a criminal code can set out a polity’s consensus that certain acts are so destructive of the
social fabric that they warrant condemnation in the polity’s name. The particular acts a polity
chooses to condemn are both reflection and source of its moral identity.83
Second, the criminal law has a unique capacity to help constitute and sustain a civil order
by virtue of its very existence, which expresses certain commitments on the polity’s part. It
expresses a commitment to treating members of the polity as responsible agents.84 Only a body of
law that recognizes and reacts to moral choices as such can affirm individual moral agency.85 Other
mechanisms of harm prevention are indifferent to the moral quality of harmful wrongdoing. They
treat human beings who inflict harm as so many destructive bacteria.86 Relatedly, the criminal law
expresses a polity’s commitment to enabling a relationship of moral accountability between
individuals and the polity as a whole.87 As Duff has long argued, criminal law is relational.88 It
79 That might be because crime is partly a function of disadvantage, because law enforcement tends to target the powerless
regardless of crime rates, or both. See, e.g., Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218, 2251-59 (2019).
80 In the aggregate, the disparate impact of our current system has functionally produced official condemnation of poor
communities of color. See generally KHALIL GIBRAN MUHAMMAD, THE CONDEMNATION OF BLACKNESS: RACE, CRIME, AND THE
MAKING OF MODERN URBAN AMERICA (2010).
81 As noted above, this stance has much in common with Durkheim and, more recently, Joshua Kleinfeld. See Durkheim,
supra note 33; Kleinfeld, supra note 36.
82 See, e.g., DUFF, supra note 13, at 144, 203, 332.
83 Accord Durkheim, supra note 33.
84 Id. at 201-11.
85 Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 THE MONIST 475 (1968); cf. Marcus Kirk Dubber, The Right to Be Punished:
Autonomy and Its Demise in Modern Penal Thought, 16 LAW & HIST. REV. 113 (1998).
86 See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Culpability and Control, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1587, 1589 (1994) (noting that “the criminal law
might treat persons as part of the biophysical flotsam and jetsam of the universe and respond solely on the basis of the type and
degree of dangerousness people threaten, without regard to moral responsibility”); Mayson, supra note70, at 322-323 (exploring
the distinction between law that affirms individual agency and predictive restraint that is “indifferent to agency altogether”).
87 See, e.g., DUFF, supra note 13, at 211, 213, 215, 274.
88E.g. id. at 39 (“[I]f we are to make normative sense of a system of criminal punishment, we must understand it in more fully
relational terms. . . .”).
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affirms the polity’s concern for both the victim of a public wrong and for the wrongdoer as
constituents of the political community. It partly constitutes the relationship between individuals
and the polity. The criminal law has these capacities in virtue of the kind of thing it is—a
mechanism of collective condemnation—regardless of what we understand to be its ultimate
purpose(s).
Alternative methods of coercion pose their own dangers. Even the abolitionist should admit
that the state will sometimes have to resort to coercion to prevent the most harmful acts. It would
indeed be preferable if we could eliminate harm solely by attending to the underlying causes of
harmful behavior. But short of human perfection, there will be murders and rapes and assaults and
thefts. Improved social welfare will not cure us of violence and deceit. The options for coercive
prevention are a “guilt-conditioned scheme” or one not conditioned by guilt.89 The latter—a
system that aspired to prevent and redress harm without condemning any act as wrongful—would
be regulatory rather than punitive. It would not condemn. It would not punish. And it would operate
without the constraint of desert.
The replacement of criminal law by a regulatory prevention regime is a terrifying prospect.
As C.S. Lewis once observed: “[W]hen we cease to consider what the criminal deserves and
consider only what will cure him or deter others, we have tacitly removed him from the sphere of
justice altogether; instead of a person, a subject of rights, we now have a mere object, a patient, a
‘case.’”90 Experts decide when the disease is cured, when the threat is disabled. Even in the best
of circumstances, such regimes veer toward tyranny.91 This is why H.L.A. Hart describes the
deterrent, desert-restricted scheme of criminal law as the “method of social control which
maximizes individual freedom within the coercive framework of law”.92
So these are the parameters of the debate. On the one hand, a formal mechanism of
collective condemnation can inflict untold harm on marginalized groups in the service of existing
power structures, as history proves. So long as the system mostly condemns acts that are in part a
function of social marginalization, as “street crime” is, it will disparately condemn alreadydisadvantaged groups. On the other hand, the criminal law is uniquely capable of expressing the
moral commitments of the polity, and of affirming the agency of its subjects and their shared
membership in a moral and political community. It is arguable that this function is critical to a
liberal republic. A regulatory regime of coercive prevention would have an equally disparate
impact on marginalized groups but would manage bodies without regard for desert.
My own view is that forsaking a mechanism of collective condemnation is not the answer
to the injustice wrought by our criminal legal system. Should we not condemn acts of exploitation
and violence, officially and collectively?93 Clarifying the concept of criminal law, furthermore,
highlights the fact that many facets of the current system that motivate reform are not features of
the criminal law per se. They are perversions of it. Our statutes are rife with “crimes” that cannot
plausibly be described as consensus public wrongs.94 Criminal process is divorced from the polity;
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criminal law institutions do not speak in the polity’s name.95 Rather than affirm the shared
membership of people who commit crimes in the moral and political community that censures
them, the criminal process operates to exclude them.96 The answer to these problems is to repair
our system for proscribing and condemning socially destructive acts, not to jettison the system
altogether.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD: WHITHER CRIMINAL LAW THEORY?
My hope is that criminal law theorists and criminal law reformers will join forces to
envision a better future for criminal law and strive to bring that future into being. That will require
reformers to grapple more deeply with theoretical questions about the nature, capacities, and value
of criminal law; and it will require theorists to engage directly with the realities that motivate
reform.97 We need both reformers and theorists in order to figure out what role a mechanism of
collective condemnation should play in a liberal republic. That question is inseparable from the
question of how the state should provide security. What part, if any, should the threat and execution
of collective moral judgments play in that endeavor?98 To the extent that a mechanism of collective
condemnation has value that is independent of its preventive effects—by enabling retributive
justice, promoting social solidarity, or constituting a polity as a community of moral agents—how
great is that value relative to other goods that the state might use its limited resources to pursue?
And how must the criminal law change to realize its distinctive value?99
There is a school of abolitionist thought that acknowledges the value of an idealized
criminal law but denies that it is possible, in practice, to transform the system we have into the
system we want. This too is a question worthy of theorists’ attention: Is there a viable path for
transformation? To answer that question, we need to know what conditions are necessary and
sufficient to make the condemnatory mechanism of criminal law meaningfully “collective”. In
Duff’s terms, we need to identify the criteria for a moral and political community, and for the
criminal law to speak in the polity’s name.100 We might also consider how to weigh the value of
moral accountability on an individual scale against the harm of undeserved group condemnation.101
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And we might think more carefully about what normative criteria govern criminalization and
punishment in the aggregate. Can we have a criminal law that does not direct its censure and
coercion primarily against disadvantaged groups—if, for instance, we shift criminalization and
enforcement away from quality-of-life crimes and toward securities fraud? What are the criteria
for the shape of the criminal law as a whole, beyond those for individual offenses?102 Given the
recursivity of the criminal law, perhaps we have a duty to make criminalization decisions in order
to re-constitute the civil order in ways that redress past racial harm and create a more just social
order, whether through criminalization “on the books” or criminalization “in action”.103 Perhaps
there is a world in which the criminal law can help to remedy the structural inequality that it has
played so central a part in creating.
CONCLUSION
To a novice professor and scholar of the criminal law, it is bewildering that there exists no
consensus—or at least no consensus as to whether there is a consensus—about what renders the
criminal law unique. Among the many contributions of The Realm of Criminal Law is this: It offers
a clear concept of criminal law. It asserts, albeit with ambivalence, that what makes the criminal
law a unique kind of law is the fact that it operates as a mechanism of collective condemnation.
Can we agree that Duff is right about this? Recognizing the uniquely condemnatory aspect
of criminal law allows for cleaner theory. We can acknowledge logical corollaries of the concept
of criminal law, including some form of negative legal moralism, some notion of a public wrong,
a retributive limit on punishment, and the fact that criminal law is relational. Maybe we can accept
pluralism with respect to the potential aims and justifications of criminal laws and sanctions. Most
importantly, we can better confront the question of whether criminal law is necessary or valuable,
and how we might strive for the most just criminal law possible in an unjust world.
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